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THE LIMITS OF THE 
NEW DEAL ANALOGY 
Barry Cushman† 
HE PAST THREE YEARS OF THE Obama Administration inev-
itably have elicited comparisons between the present day 
and the era of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New 
Deal. Law journals have organized symposia around the 
issue, and bar associations have commissioned panels to discuss and 
debate points of similarity and contrast.1 These conversations have 
been frequently illuminating, but they often overlook an important 
point that many may have forgotten: compared with the major re-
form initiatives undertaken during President Obama’s tenure, the 
measures enacted by New Deal Congresses enjoyed a remarkable 
degree of bipartisan support. 
It is widely recognized that support for the major bills enacted 
during the 111th Congress was far from bipartisan. For example, 
the first stimulus bill, also known as the American Recovery and 
                                                                                                 
† Barry Cushman is the James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law, David H. Ibbeken ’71 
Research Professor, and Professor of History, University of Virginia, and Forbes Visiting 
Fellow, James Madison Program, Princeton University. Copyright © 2012 Barry Cushman. 
1 See, e.g., “FDR and Obama: Are There Constitutional Law Lessons from the 
New Deal for the Obama Administration?,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
Constitutional Law 15th Anniversary Symposium, January 20, 2012; “The New 
New Deal: From De-Regulation to Re-Regulation” (Thrower Symposium), 
Emory University School of Law, February 11, 2010; “Judging the ‘New’ New 
Deal: The Constitution in Times of Economic Crisis,” Virginia Bar Association 
Annual Meeting, Williamsburg, Virginia, January 22, 2010. 
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Reinvestment Act of 2009,2 garnered the support of only three Re-
publican Senators,3 one of whom, Arlen Specter, would soon be-
come a Democrat,4 and not a single Republican member of the 
House.5 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act passed the House with the support of only three Repub-
licans, and likewise received the support of only three Republican 
senators.6 The Affordable Care Act7 passed the House by a vote of 
220-215, with only one Republican voting in favor,8 and in the Sen-
ate without any Republican support.9  
Compare the votes on major pieces of recovery and reform legis-
lation during the New Deal. The Emergency Banking Act of 1933 
passed the House by a voice vote and the Senate by a margin of 73-
7, with 22 Republicans voting in favor and only five opposed.10 The 
Glass-Steagall Banking Act passed the Senate by a voice vote and the 
House by a vote of 262-19.11 The Federal Emergency Relief Act of 
1933 passed the Senate by a voice vote, and the House by a vote of 
331-42, with 74 Republicans voting in favor.12 The Securities Act of 
1933 was passed by a voice vote in both houses of Congress.13 The 
                                                                                                 
2 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
3 155 Cong. Rec. S2069 (2009). 
4 155 Cong. Rec. S4953 (2009). 
5 155 Cong. Rec. H748 (2009). 
6 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); 156 Cong. Rec. H5261 (2010) (House); 156 Cong. Rec. 
S5933 (2010) (Senate). 
7 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
8 155 Cong. Rec. H12967-68 (2009). This is the initial vote in the House, taken on 
November 7, 2009. When the House voted for the adoption of the Senate’s 
amendments on March 21, 2010, the vote was 219-212, with no Republicans 
voting in favor. 156 Cong. Rec. H2153 (2010). 
9 155 Cong. Rec. S13891 (2009). 
10 48 Stat. 1, 4 (1933); 77 Cong. Rec. 81 (1933) (House); 77 Cong. Rec. 67 (1933) 
(Senate). 
11 48 Stat. 162 (1933); 77 Cong. Rec. 4182 (1933) (Senate); 77 Cong. Rec. 4058 
(1933) (House). 
12 48 Stat. 55 (1933); 77 Cong. Rec. 2615 (1933) (Senate); 77 Cong. Rec. 2129-30 
(1933) (House). 
13 48 Stat. 74 (1933); 77 Cong. Rec. 2954 (1933) (House); 77 Cong. Rec. 2995 
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Securities Exchange Act passed the House by a vote of 281-84 with 
the support of 22 Republicans, and the Senate by a vote of 62-13, 
with 14 Republicans in the yes column, one Democrat voting no, 
and eleven Democrats not voting.14 The National Industrial Recov-
ery Act passed in the House by a vote of 325-76, with Republicans 
voting in favor by a margin of 54-50 and 25 Democrats voting no, 
and in the Senate by a vote of 58-24, with the support of nine Re-
publicans, while four Democrats voted no and nine did not vote.15 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 passed the House by a 
vote of 315-98 with the support of 39 Republicans, and the Senate 
by a vote of 64-20, with fifteen Republicans voting yes while four 
Democrats voted no and seven Democrats did not vote.16 The Na-
tional Labor Relations Act was passed by a voice vote in the House, 
and by a vote of 63-12 in the Senate, with 12 Republicans voting in 
favor while four Democrats voted no and fifteen members of FDR’s 
party did not vote on the measure.17 The Social Security Act was 
passed by a vote of 372-33 in the House, where Republicans sup-
ported the measure by a margin of 79-18, and by a vote of 77-6 in 
the Senate, where Republicans voted in favor by a margin of 15-5 
and eight Democrats did not vote.18 And the Fair Labor Standards 
Act was passed by a vote of 314-97 in the House, with the Republi-
cans voting in favor by a margin of 46-41 and 56 Democrats defect-
ing. The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 56-28, with Democrats 
casting fully half of the negative votes while nine members of their 
                                                                                                 
(1933) (Senate). 
14 48 Stat. 881 (1934); 78 Cong. Rec. 8116 (1934) (House); 78 Cong. Rec. 8714 
(1934) (Senate). 
15 48 Stat. 195 (1933); 77 Cong. Rec. 4373 (1933) (House); 77 Cong. Rec. 5424-
25 (1933) (Senate). 
16 48 Stat. 31 (1933); 77 Cong. Rec. 766 (1933) (House); 77 Cong. Rec. 2562 
(1933) (Senate). 
17 49 Stat. 449 (1935); 79 Cong. Rec. 9731 (1935) (House); 79 Cong. Rec. 7681 
(1935) (Senate). 
18 49 Stat. 620 (1935); 79 Cong. Rec. 6069-70 (1935) (House); 79 Cong. Rec. 
9650 (1935) (Senate). 
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party did not vote.19 
Such lopsided, bipartisan majorities also characterized congres-
sional support for many of the lesser-known New Deal initiatives. 
The following bills were passed by voice votes in both houses of 
Congress: the act extending the charter of the Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation;20 the Connally Hot Oil Act;21 both Frazier-
Lemke Farm Debt Relief Acts;22 the Farm Credit Act;23 the Rural 
Electrification Administration Act;24 the Agricultural Marketing 
Agreement Act of 1937;25 and the act creating the Civilian Conser-
vation Corps.26 The Homeowners Refinancing Act of 1933 was 
passed in the Senate by a voice vote and by a vote of 383-4 in the 
House, where three of the four negative votes were cast by Demo-
crats.27 The National Housing Act of 1934 passed the House by a 
vote of 176-19, and in the Senate by a vote of 71-12, with 21 Re-
publicans voting in support, three Democrats voting no, and nine 
Democrats not voting.28 The Emergency Relief Appropriation Act 
                                                                                                 
19 52 Stat. 1060 (1938); 83 Cong. Rec. 7449-50 (1938) (House); 81 Cong. Rec. 
7957 (1937) (Senate). 
20 49 Stat. 1 (1935); 79 Cong. Rec. 998 (1935) (Senate); 79 Cong. Rec. 1196 
(1933) (House). 
21 49 Stat. 30 (1935); 79 Cong. Rec. 2150 (1935) (House); 79 Cong. Rec. 764 
(1935) (Senate). 
22 48 Stat. 1289 (1934); 78 Cong. Rec. 12138 (1934) (House); 78 Cong. Rec. 
11302 (1934) (Senate); 49 Stat. 943 (1935); 79 Cong. Rec. 14334 (1935) 
(House); 79 Cong. Rec. 13645 (1935) (Senate). 
23 48 Stat. 257, 258 (1933); 77 Cong. Rec. 4710 (1933) (House); 77 Cong. Rec. 
5529 (1933) (Senate). 
24 49 Stat. 1363, 1364 (1936); 80 Cong. Rec. 3317 (1936) (Senate); 80 Cong. Rec. 
5318 (1936) (Senate). 
25 50 Stat. 246 (1937); 81 Cong. Rec. 3594 (House); 81 Cong. Rec. 4969 (1937) 
(Senate). 
26 48 Stat. 22, 23 (1933); 77 Cong. Rec. 937 (1933) (Senate); 77 Cong. Rec. 995 
(1933) (House). 
27 48 Stat. 128 (1933); 77 Cong. Rec. 4995 (1933) (Senate); 77 Cong. Rec. 2584-
85 (1933) (House). 
28 48 Stat. 1247 (1934); 78 Cong. Rec. 11394 (1934) (House); 78 Cong. Rec. 
12013 (1934) (Senate). 
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of 1936 passed the House by a vote of 341-38, with Republicans 
voting in favor by a margin of 62-31, and the Senate by a vote of 62-
14, with seven Republicans voting yes, three Democrats voting no, 
and sixteen Democrats not voting.29 The Housing Act of 1937 
passed the House by a vote of 275-86 with the support of 23 Repub-
licans, while 39 Democrats voted against it. The Senate passed the 
bill by a vote of 64-16, with six Republicans voting in favor while 
eight Democrats voted no and eleven Democrats did not vote.30 The 
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1937 passed the House by a 
voice vote, and the Senate by a vote of 58-15, where seven Demo-
crats voted no and thirteen Democrats did not vote.31 The Railroad 
Retirement Act of 1937 passed the Senate by a voice vote, and the 
House by a vote of 363-1, with the sole dissenting vote cast by a 
Democrat.32 The companion Carrier Taxing Act passed both cham-
bers by a voice vote.33  
Even the more contentious pieces of legislation enacted by the 
New Deal Congresses managed to attract some nontrivial measure 
of bipartisan support. The act creating the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity passed the House by a vote of 306-92 with the support of 17 Re-
publicans, and the Senate by a vote of 63-20, with 14 Republicans 
voting yes while three Democrats defected and nine Democrats did 
not vote.34 The Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935 passed 
the House by a vote of 317-7 with the support of 31 Republicans, 
and the Senate by a vote of 66-13, with 9 Republicans crossing the 
                                                                                                 
29 49 Stat. 1597, 1608 (1936); 80 Cong. Rec. 7022-23 (1936) (House); 80 Cong. 
Rec. 8519 (1936) (Senate). 
30 50 Stat. 888 (1937); 81 Cong. Rec. 9293-94 (1937) (House); 81 Cong. Rec. 
8373 (1937) (Senate). 
31 49 Stat. 991 (1937); 81 Cong. Rec. 2128 (1937) (House); 81 Cong. Rec. 3145 
(1937) (Senate). 
32 50 Stat. 307 (1937); 81 Cong. Rec. 6228 (1937) (Senate); 81 Cong. Rec. 6093-
94 (1937) (House).  
33 50 Stat. 435 (1937); 81 Cong. Rec. 6304 (1937) (House); 81 Cong. Rec. 6345 
(1937) (Senate). 
34 48 Stat. 58 (1933); 77 Cong. Rec. 2341 (1933) (House); 77 Cong. Rec. 2808-09 
(1933) (Senate). 
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aisle in support while four Democrats voted no and nine Democrats 
did not vote.35 The Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act 
passed the House by a vote of 267-97, with the support of 20 Re-
publicans and over the dissent of 25 Democrats, and the Senate by a 
vote of 56-20, with five Republicans voting yes while eight Demo-
crats voted no and twelve Democrats did not vote.36 And the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act of 1938 passed the House by a vote of 264-
135 with the support of 14 Republicans and over the objection of 54 
Democrats, and the Senate by a vote of 56-31, where sixteen Dem-
ocrats joined twelve Republicans, two Farmer-Laborites, and a Pro-
gressive in opposition, while eight Democratic senators did not 
vote.37 In sum, on major issues of relief, recovery, and reform, 
there was far more bipartisanship during the New Deal than there 
has been in the 111th and 112th Congresses. 
Republican support, though welcome, was not indispensably 
necessary to carry these measures through Congress. Throughout 
the 1930s, the Democrats enjoyed large majorities in both houses. 
The circumstances of the Great Depression and the inadequacy of 
the Hoover Administration’s efforts to deal with them cemented the 
influence of a political coalition that would entrust the presidency 
and both Houses of Congress to the Democratic Party from 1933 
forward. Consider the results of the biennial elections from 1932 to 
1940. After the 1932 election, according to Congressional Quarter-
ly’s Guide to Congress, there were 310 Democrats and 117 Republi-
cans in the House of Representatives; in the Senate there were 60 
Democrats and 35 Republicans. After the 1934 election, there were 
319 Democrats and 103 Republicans in the House; in the Senate 
there were now 69 Democrats and 25 Republicans. In the wake of 
the 1936 election there were 331 Democrats and only 89 Republi-
cans in the House; in the Senate there were now 76 Democrats and 
                                                                                                 
35 49 Stat. 115 (1935); 79 Cong. Rec. 5150 (1935) (House); 79 Cong. Rec. 5135 
(1935) (Senate). 
36 49 Stat. 1148 (1936); 80 Cong. Rec. 2578-79 (1936) (House); 80 Cong. Rec. 
2165 (1936) (Senate). 
37 52 Stat. 31 (1938); 83 Cong. Rec. 1727 (1938) (House); 83 Cong. Rec. 1881-82 
(1938) (Senate). 
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only 16 Republicans. In the 1938 election, the Democrats lost and 
the Republicans gained seven seats in the Senate; in the House the 
Democrats lost 70 seats and the Republicans picked up 75, bringing 
the margin of the Democratic majority down to 261-164. After the 
1940 election, the Democrats still held 66 seats to the Republicans’ 
28 in the Senate, and the Democrats enlarged their margin in the 
House to 268-162.38 Notwithstanding some bruising losses in 1938, 
the Democrats enjoyed substantial majorities in the House through-
out the period, and a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate from 
1934 on. 
Coupled with the bipartisan congressional support, this electoral 
dominance had two important implications for the durability of 
New Deal legislation. First, it guaranteed that in the near term there 
would be no significant movement within Congress to repeal that 
legislation. Second, it ensured that if the Supreme Court held such 
legislation unconstitutional, Congress would get a second bite at the 
apple. In several instances in which the Hughes Court held that a 
legislative attempt to address a particular problem did not pass con-
stitutional muster, the New Deal Congresses would have, and 
would take, the opportunity to reformulate the program to achieve 
the desired end through means consistent with prevailing constitu-
tional doctrine. In 1935, for instance, the Court unanimously inval-
idated the first Frazier-Lemke Farm Debt Relief Act on the ground 
that it impaired the vested rights of mortgage creditors.39 Justice 
Brandeis’s opinion for the Court offered Congress guidance on how 
the statute might be reformulated so as to conform to the require-
ments of the Fifth Amendment, and Congress quickly accepted his 
counsel and enacted an appropriately redrafted measure. When the 
revised statute was challenged in 1937, the Court – without any 
intervening change in personnel – unanimously sustained it.40 Simi-
lar patterns of judicial invalidation and legislative reformulation sal-
vaged congressional efforts to regulate the struggling agricultural 
                                                                                                 
38 2 Congressional Quarterly, Guide to Congress 1305 (6th ed. 2008). 
39 Louisville Joint Stock & Bank Co. v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). 
40 Wright v. Vinton Branch Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937). 
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and energy sectors, and to provide retirement pensions for railway 
employees.41 As these examples demonstrate, throughout the 
1930s, Congress repeatedly employed this adaptive legislative strat-
egy with remarkable success.  
This success, again, was made possible by the dual luxuries of 
electoral dominance and bipartisan support. But as the results of the 
2010 mid-term elections made abundantly clear, the Democrats of 
today do not enjoy the same electoral dominance that their forbears 
in the 1930s did. And as the roll call votes from the 111th Congress 
make equally clear, their signature legislative achievements did not 
enjoy bipartisan support. It requires no great insight to predict that, 
in the event the Court were to declare all or portions of the Afford-
able Care Act unconstitutional, it would not be re-enacted in any-
thing like its current form by the present Congress. Nor does it re-
quire clairvoyance to see that if President Obama is not re-elected 
and the Republicans hold the House and regain control of the Senate 
in the 2012 elections, that Act is virtually certain to undergo sub-
stantial modification if not outright repeal in the next Congress.  
The post-War era of “consensus” culture was possible in part be-
cause there was a broad measure of popular agreement about the 
proper role of government in the nation’s economic life. We do not 
live in such an era of consensus with respect to such issues today. 
Compare, for example, polling data on the momentous constitu-
tional issues facing the Supreme Court in 1937 with public opinion 
data on the Affordable Care Act. Polls from the 1930s consistently 
showed strong public support for minimum wage regulation and for 
the old-age pension provisions of the Social Security Act.42 In invali-
dating either of those statutes, the Court would have been frustrat-
ing both the legislative and the popular will. By contrast, the most 
recent Gallup poll on the Affordable Care Act, taken in November 
of 2011, shows the American people favoring repeal by a margin of 
                                                                                                 
41 See Barry Cushman, “The Hughes Court and Constitutional Consultation,” 1998 
J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 79. 
42 See Barry Cushman, “Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup: Public Opinion and Constitu-
tional Change in the 1930s,” 50 Buff. L. Rev. 7, 40-41, 56-57 (2002). 
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47%-42%.43 The more recently released Kaiser Health Tracking 
Poll reports that 67% of Americans have an unfavorable view of the 
Act’s individual mandate, and 54% would like to see the Supreme 
Court declare the mandate unconstitutional.44 And as a result of the 
2010 elections, the Act as a whole does not enjoy the support of the 
present Congress. A Court decision striking down the Act’s indi-
vidual mandate therefore would be flouting neither the current con-
gressional will nor present popular preferences. Instead, such a de-
cision would be consistent with them. We should bear such im-
portant differences in mind when contemplating the extent to which 





                                                                                                 
43 www.gallup.com/poll/150773/americans-tilt-toward-favoring-repeal-
healthcare-law.aspx. 
44 www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/8274.cfm. 
